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ABSTRACT 
This article dissects the sources of partisan bias in the institutional structure of the U.S. electoral 
college. Conventional wisdom and results of recent presidential elections suggest that the 
electoral college is biased in favor of the Republican Party. While previous empirical studies 
have challenged this conventional wisdom, George Bush's 2000 electoral college victory revived 
this debate. Our research provides a direct analysis of the multiple sources of bias within the 
electoral college and examines their individual impact on each party's electoral fortunes over the 
last eleven elections (1964-2004) with particular attention on the 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections. Our results are in line with previous analyses indicating no significant bias within the 
electoral college. We conclude that parties and their presidential candidates are rational political 
actors who utilize sophisticated campaign strategies which allow them to efficiently employ their 
resources and limit any institutional disadvantages they may face. 
  
The purpose of this research is to examine the sources of partisan bias in the institutional 
structure of the U.S. electoral college by dissecting the various sources of bias and directly 
examining their individual impact on presidential elections over the last four decades. While 
numerous scholars have examined bias in the U.S. House of Representatives (Brady and 
Grofman 1991; Campagna and Grofman 1990; Campbell 1995, 1996; Grofman 1983; King and 
Browning 1987; Niemi and Fett 1986; Tufte 1973), only a few have systematically examined 
bias in the electoral college (Berthoud 1997; Brunell and Grofman 1997; Destler 1996; Garand 
and Parent 1991; Gelman and King 1994; Gelman, Katz, and King 2004; Johnston, Rossiter, 
and Pattie 2005). Moreover, previous analyses of electoral college bias fail to directly address 
the most recent results of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections which were substantially 
influenced by the distribution of electoral college votes. 
Conventional wisdom among many journalists, political strategists, and even political scientists 
is that the electoral college is significantly biased in favor of the Republican Party and 
consequently provides the Republican Party with a “lock” on the electoral college.[2] While 
empirical research by Garand and Parent (1991), Destler (1996), Grofman, Brunell, and 
Campagna (1997), and Gelman and King (1994) have challenged this view, George Bush's 
electoral college victory in 2000 with less than 50 percent of the two-party vote has revived the 
issue. To provide some clarity to the continuing debate, our research provides a direct analysis 
of the various sources of partisan bias (malapportionment, turnout differences, and geographic 
distribution of party vote shares) within the electoral college and examines their individual 
impact on the Democratic and Republican Parties' electoral fortunes over the last eleven 
elections. Finally, a detailed analysis of the 2000 and 2004 presidential election is presented in 
hopes of providing an improved understanding of the specific factors which contributed to 
George W. Bush's electoral college victory in 2000 despite his failure to receive a plurality of the 
popular vote. 
 
AMERICAN ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS 
The role of American political institutions, their organizational structure, and the various 
outcomes they produce have been some of the most debated and divisive elements in 
American politics over the past several decades. The concept of institutional structure is one 
that crosses many disciplines, as well as various fields and subfields of political science. Not 
only have the causes of institutional organization and structure been of scholarly interest, but 
arguably greater scholarly emphasis has also been placed on examining various institutions in 
order to understand their effects on the political environment in which they function. For 
example, the most widely studied element of American political institutions is the legislative 
process, typically with greater emphasis on the U.S. Congress. It is not hard to understand why 
the legislative process has garnered such attention, which is most likely because of the degree 
of complexity and detail with which it operates as well as the various outcomes it generates. 
American electoral institutions are also of great interest to political scholars. The two most 
significant and unique elements of our electoral institutions are the winner-take-all system of 
choosing governmental representatives and the electoral college through which we select 
presidents. The manner in which the winner-take-all system of elections interacts with the 
electoral college creates an interesting electoral dynamic that has led some scholars to 
speculate about potential biases inherent in the electoral college. In this article, we focus on 
examining the legitimacy of conventional wisdom which suggests that the electoral college has 
institutional mechanisms that create biased electoral outcomes. 
Before addressing the details of the theory of institutional bias we posit in this article, it is 
appropriate to acknowledge the two methods by which the structure and organization of 
institutions—specifically the electoral college—are typically studied. First, examining the role of 
political actors in utilizing various aspects of a given institution for the purpose of manipulating 
outcomes is important to understanding how the structure of institutions allows for strategic 
behavior of actors. Many scholars have examined the various roles of political actors and the 
different ways in which they interact with the electoral college. Such areas as candidate 
campaign and travel strategies (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2002; Reeves, Chen, and Nagano 
2004; Shaw 1999), candidate resource allocations to important states (Colantoni, Levesque, 
and Ordeshook 1975), micro/macro level citizen voting patterns (Jackson and Carsey 1999; 
Nardulli 1994), as well as examining how the strategic role of states and their interactions with 
variations in citizen voting power (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1986) have been examined. It is 
quite plausible that the reason we observe seemingly biased outcomes in the electoral college 
(i.e., in the 2000 election) is because of the way various political actors (specifically candidates) 
utilize different elements of the institution to maximize benefits. While examining the roles of 
political actors and institutional outcomes is a plausible method of examining bias in the 
electoral college and could potentially be the focus of an expanded research project, we attempt 
to take a more general approach by focusing on the second conventional method of studying 
institutions. The focus of this article is on how the structure and organization of a given 
institution, in this case the electoral college, influences various electoral outcomes. 
The way we structure our theory of partisan bias in the electoral college is by addressing the 
puzzle: are there institutional and electoral components of the electoral college that, ceteris 
paribus, create a consistent bias toward a particular party? Recent scholars have attempted to 
address similar puzzles in various ways. Employing methods from Gelman and King (1994) 
regarding the evaluation of electoral bias in congressional elections, Gelman, Katz, and King 
(2004) address bias in the electoral college. Their two primary mechanisms for bias are a 
particular party's/candidate's average vote share and its interaction with the probability of 
securing a majority of electoral votes, as well as the degree of voting power possessed by 
citizens of various states (see also Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1986) and potential electoral 
institutions (popular vote, congressional district vote, and others). Although Gelman, Katz, and 
King (2004) did not find evidence of systematic bias in the electoral college of the past several 
decades, conflicting evidence from other scholars suggests a different story. Johnston, Rossiter, 
and Pattie (2005), for example, address the issue of bias by examining several factors that they 
expect would interact to produce bias in the electoral college on a more conditional basis, rather 
than in any systemic sense. They hypothesize that institutional bias in the electoral college is a 
conditional function of two primary interacting factors: characteristics of a jurisdictional 
electorate (population size, voter turnout, and others), and the distribution of vote efficiency 
(wasted, efficient, or surplus votes). Their major findings are that institutional bias favored 
George Bush in 2000 (as a function of small state advantage, low turnout, and efficient votes), 
but favored John Kerry in 2004, albeit not as successfully. 
While recent scholars have addressed issues of bias in the electoral college, we argue that the 
direct sources of partisan bias have yet to be clearly examined in a systematic fashion. 
Moreover, identifying the difference between partisan bias and swing ratio is a significant 
element in understanding party/candidate vote shares and should be clarified when examining 
institutional/electoral bias. The first reason why the theory of partisan bias posited in this article 
is important is because of the fact that it differentiates partisan bias from swing ratio. The 
confusion between the two concepts is inherent in much of the previous work on institutional 
bias in the electoral college. By clarifying these two concepts, which will follow in the next 
section, and identifying their consequences, we can better understand the characteristics of 
partisan bias in the institution of the electoral college. Second, this work attempts to expand the 
concept of vote efficiency (see Johnston, Rossiter, and Pattie 2005) in order to explain how 
partisan bias has been and can be largely driven by either party systematically utilizing wasteful 
and/or efficient votes. Finally, it is important to continuously reevaluate existing theories of 
institutional and electoral bias in large part because the scope of American political elections, 
institutions, and the public are continuously evolving elements of our political system. Any 
advances in the examination of systematic or conditional partiality present in our electoral 
institutions can aid our understanding of the ways in which the structure of political institutions 
can have substantial influence on various outcomes. 
 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE BIAS 
While the vast majority of research regarding partisan bias has focused on bias within the 
House of Representatives, a small number of scholars have examined the issue with regard to 
the electoral college. Borrowing liberally from the work of King and Browning (1987), the initial 
research on this topic was conducted by Garand and Parent (1991), who developed measures 
of representational form and partisan bias in the relationship between popular vote proportions 
and electoral vote proportions for each presidential election from 1872 to 1988. To the surprise 
of many observers of the presidential election process, the results of their analysis indicated that 
the electoral college was actually slightly biased in favor of the Democratic Party. Questioning 
the methods of Garand and Parent (1991), the research team of Grofman, Brunell, and 
Campagna (1997) reexamined the influence of partisan bias in the electoral college. Employing 
a hypothetical method of analysis, Grofman, Brunell, and Campagna's findings indicated that 
while partisan bias favored the Republican Party from 1900 to 1940, there has been no 
significant partisan bias in recent elections. 
While the original works of Garand and Parent (1991), Grofman, Brunell, and Campagna 
(1997), and the more recent research of Gelman, Katz, and King (2004) provide sophisticated 
analyses of bias in the electoral college over the last century, they fail to provide a direct 
analysis of the sources of bias. The purpose of this research is to fill this void in our 
understanding of the electoral college system by examining directly each of the sources of bias 
and dissecting their individual influences on contemporary presidential elections. 
PLAN OF ANALYSES 
Before beginning our analysis, we first define partisan bias and discuss how it differs from the 
swing ratio. As noted by Grofman, Brunell and Campagna (1997), confusion between partisan 
bias and swing ratio has led to much of the confusion regarding electoral college bias. Second, 
we discuss in detail the sources of partisan bias, wasted votes, and the price paid per electoral 
college vote. Third, we examine whether either party has systematically suffered or benefited 
more than the other party from these sources of bias in their attempts to win electoral college 
votes. Finally, we provide a detailed analysis of the factors which led to George W. Bush's 
electoral college victory in 2000, despite his popular vote defeat, and his reelection in 2004. 
 
Partisan Bias versus Swing Ratio 
While much of the confusion over the issue of partisan bias has been on account of the use of 
improper measures, a large portion of the misunderstanding of bias in the electoral college is 
because of the confusion between partisan bias and swing ratio. In two-party democratic 
political contests, partisan bias and swing ratio are the two primary measures of the 
characteristics of the association between a party's vote share and its share of electoral college 
votes. 
The swing ratio is a measure of the responsiveness of the electoral system to changes in the 
proportion of the vote each party receives. In general, the swing ratio is the expected electoral 
college vote increase for each percentage point increase in a party's share of the aggregate 
popular vote. The second measure of the association between a party's vote share and its 
share of electoral college votes is partisan bias, which represents the degree to which 
competing political parties receiving the same vote proportions receive identical proportions of 
electoral college votes. More specifically, an electoral institution characterized by partisan bias 
produces differential treatment for the advantaged and the disadvantaged party, with the former 
receiving a higher proportion of electoral college votes than the latter for any given proportion of 
popular votes. As King and Browning (1987) state in their analysis of congressional bias, 
[p]artisan bias introduces asymmetry into the seats-votes relationship, resulting in an unfair 
partisan differential in the ability to win legislative seats: the advantaged party will be able to 
receive a larger number of seats for a fixed number of votes than will the disadvantaged 
party . . . We express the absence of partisan bias as partisan symmetry. In general, this means 
that in an election where X percent of the Democratic votes produces an allocation of Y percent 
of the seats to the Democrats, then in another election under the same system X percent of the 
Republican votes would yield the Y percent Republican allocation of seats. 
While an unbiased system yields identical electoral college votes for equivalent Republican and 
Democratic vote proportions, a biased system yields more votes for one party than the other. 
For example, if the Democratic Party receives 48 percent of the electoral college votes with 50 
percent of the popular vote and the Republican Party receives 52 percent of the electoral 
college votes with 50 percent of the popular vote, the system has a 4 percent bias in favor of the 
Republican Party. 
 
Sources of Partisan Bias 
Two basic factors contribute to partisan bias in the electoral college. The first is a disparity in the 
vote costs between parties. This is on account of differences in the population and/or number of 
voters per electoral college vote, which varies as a result of turnout differences and 
malapportionment. The second factor is asymmetries in the distribution of wasted votes 
between the parties which may occur as a result of variation in the distribution of partisan voting 
strength across states. For instance, if either party consistently wins competitive states and/or 
the larger states, they will waste significantly fewer votes in the United States' winner-take-all 
election process. 
Ultimately, the number of electoral college votes a party wins depends on three factors: (1) the 
number of votes it has available to spend; (2) the price the party pays in popular votes for each 
electoral college vote; and (3) the number of votes the party wastes. A party that wins states 
where the number of votes per electoral college vote is low and/or wins states by narrow 
margins will spend its votes most efficiently; and the more efficiently a party spends its votes, 
the more electoral college votes it will win. 
 
ANALYSES OF BIAS [3] 
Vote Costs 
The “price” of electoral college votes varies significantly between states. As Article II, Section I 
of the Constitution mandates that electoral college votes are allocated “equal to the whole 
number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress,” there 
is tremendous variation in the cost of electoral college votes. The fact that each state, no matter 
how small its population, is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution at least one seat in the House 
of Representatives and two seats in the U.S. Senate, even the smallest states receive at least 
three electoral college votes. Consequently, the electoral college overrepresents the least 
populous states, and the cost of electoral college votes in smaller states is potentially much 
lower than the cost of votes in larger states. As noted previously, these differences in the cost of 
votes can provide a significant source of partisan bias when one party consistently wins a 
significant number of small states. 
As one would expect, considering the Constitutional requirement of at least three electoral 
college votes to every state, smaller states have substantially fewer citizens per electoral 
college vote than larger states. As Table 1 clearly displays, the population per electoral college 
vote varies dramatically between the states. [4]  For instance, the average population per 
electoral college vote in California (522,023) over the last eleven elections is 3.73 times as large 
as the average population per electoral college vote in Wyoming (139,976). 
 
Ultimately, these differences in the population per electoral college vote present the possibility 
for significant electoral bias. If either party has an electoral advantage in smaller states, they are 
more likely to spend their votes efficiently and enjoy an advantage in the competition for 
electoral college votes. With this in mind, we examine the average number of victories by each 
party's presidential candidate in the least expensive and most expensive states. When one 
examines the ten least expensive states, the results clearly suggest a bias in favor of the 
Republican Party. Of the eleven elections since 1964, Republicans have been victorious 70 
percent of the time in the ten least expensive states, compared to only 55 percent of the time in 
the most expensive states, and 61 percent of the time in the other states. However, when one 
examines the average population per electoral college vote between the two parties, the results 
indicate only a modest and statistically nonsignificant Republican Party advantage. Specifically, 
for the 1964-2004 elections, the states in which the Republican candidate was victorious had an 
average population of 365,039 individuals per electoral college vote compared to Democratic 
states which had an average population of 359,660 votes per electoral college vote. This 
represents a difference of only 5,379 or rather 1.4 percent of the average population per 
electoral college vote. 
While state populations are used to determine the number of electoral college votes allocated to 
each state, the population per electoral college vote only provides an indirect measure of the 
cost of electoral college votes. As one would expect, turnout varies significantly from state-to-
state and therefore provides the chance for additional variation in the cost of electoral college 
votes between states. The direct and accurate measure of the cost of electoral college votes 
can be determined more by calculating the average number of actual votes cast per electoral 
college vote in each state. 
Table 2 presents the average number of votes cast per electoral college vote in the ten most 
and least expensive states between 1964 and 2004. [5] Once again, these results indicate 
substantial variation in the cost of electoral college votes between states. While the costs of an 
electoral college vote in Alaska averages only 33,230 votes, the average cost per electoral 
college vote in Massachusetts is 112,644 votes. The cost of an electoral college vote from 
Massachusetts is 3.4 times the cost of one from Alaska. Clearly, variation in the cost of electoral 
college votes provides a potentially significant source of partisan bias. 
 
 
 
While Table 2 unmistakably indicates a disparity in the cost of electoral college votes among the 
states, once again, this will only produce partisan bias if the system consistently provides one 
party with a distinct and systematic electoral advantage. To examine this issue, we first report 
the number of times each party has been victorious in the least expensive and most expensive 
electoral college vote states. A review of this data parallels the analysis previously discussed, 
again supporting conventional wisdom and indicating that the Republican Party more 
consistently wins the least expensive states while the Democratic Party relies more heavily on 
the most expensive states for their support. 
Although Table 2 provides a cursory view of the partisan differences in the cost of electoral 
college votes, it does not present the complete picture. The more telling and appropriate means 
of examining this factor is to compare the actual difference in the average cost per electoral 
college vote between the two parties. With this in mind, we have calculated the average cost 
that each party has paid per electoral college vote over the period of our analysis (1964-2004). 
When one examines the overall difference between the parties in costs, there is only a minimal 
and statistically nonsignificant difference in favor of the Republican Party. Republican 
candidates have paid an average of 78,643 votes per electoral college vote in comparison to 
Democrats who paid an average of 81,094. This represents a difference of only 2,451 votes 
cast per electoral college, or rather 661,770 fewer votes to achieve the 270 electoral college 
votes required to win the presidential election. 
 
Wasted Votes 
The second factor contributing to partisan bias in the electoral college is asymmetries in the 
distribution of wasted votes between the parties which may occur as a result of variation in the 
distribution of partisan voting strength across states. By reason of the winner-take-all system 
employed by the vast majority of states (Maine and Nebraska are the exceptions), all votes 
above 50 percent + 1 for a party's candidate can be considered wasted votes. In addition, 
because of the winner-take-all system, all votes cast in states where the party's presidential 
candidate is defeated are considered wasted votes. 
In Table 3, we present the number of votes each party wasted in states where they were 
victorious over the period of our analysis. An initial examination of this data suggests that the 
Republican Party has wasted significantly more votes (75,910,759) than the Democratic Party 
(53,791,196) over the last eleven elections in states where they were victorious. However, upon 
further analysis, the data reveal that this difference is actually because of the greater number of 
Republican presidential victories over the period of our analysis. More specifically, the party 
receiving the greatest number of popular votes naturally wins a greater number of states and, as 
a result, wastes more votes than the losing party. 
A more appropriate means of examining the number of votes wasted by each party is to 
evaluate separately the average number of votes each party wastes in years that their 
candidates win and also lose the general election. In contrast to the analysis of the total number 
of votes, these more appropriate measures suggest only a slight bias in favor of the Republican 
Party. In comparing the average number of votes wasted by each party in years when they won 
the general election, we find that the Republican Party wasted an average of 612,170 more 
votes than the Democratic Party. However, comparing the average number of votes wasted by 
each party in years when they lost the general election, we find that the Democratic Party 
wasted more votes with an average of 842,576 more votes. Subtracting these two figures, we 
find that the Democratic Party has wasted more votes (230,406) than the Republican Party. 
While all votes over 50 percent + 1 can be considered wasted votes, all votes in states where a 
candidate receives less than 50 percent are also considered wasted votes. Consequently, if 
either party consistently loses competitive states, they will spend their votes less efficiently 
which, once again, may lead to partisan bias. 
The number of votes and average percentage of votes wasted by each party in states where 
their candidate was defeated over the last eleven presidential elections are reported in Table 4. 
The results indicate that both parties consistently waste more votes in losing states in years 
when they lose the national popular vote. Moreover, this difference is quite substantial, with the 
losing party wasting 34 times as many votes as the winning party in 1984, 24 times as many 
votes in 1972, and 17 times as many votes in 1964. Consequently, as a result of losing more 
presidential elections, Democratic candidates have wasted a significantly greater number of 
votes in losing causes than Republican candidates over the 40-year period of our analysis. 
Although this suggests a significant bias toward the Republican Party, further analysis shows 
these results are primarily a consequence of the two landslide victories that the Republican 
Party enjoyed in 1972 and 1984. For the remaining five elections, in which the Republican Party 
received a smaller margin of victory, the difference in the number of wasted votes between the 
two parties is significantly smaller and actually favors the Democratic Party. Interestingly, when 
one compares the average percentage of votes wasted in losing causes between the two 
parties, there is practically no difference. Both parties, on average, receive about 38 percent of 
the vote in states where they lose. Ultimately, we find neither party is systematically 
disadvantaged by the number of votes which they waste in losing states. 
 
PARTISAN BIAS? 
Is the electoral college biased toward the Republican or Democratic Party? In line with the 
findings of Grofman, Brunell, and Campagna (1997) and Destler (1996), the results of our 
analyses also suggest an absence of any significant partisan bias within the contemporary 
electoral college. While it may appear that the Republican Party would enjoy an advantage in 
the electoral college because of consistently winning more of the cheap electoral college states, 
the top ten least expensive states only represent a total of 32 electoral college votes. The 
Democratic Party can overcome this advantage by simply winning any of the top ten most 
expensive states which each represent at least 41 electoral college votes. As noted previously, 
while the Republican Party has spent their votes more efficiently over the period of analysis, the 
difference between the two parties represents an average of only 2,451 popular votes per 
electoral college vote, which is not substantially or statistically significant. Regarding the second 
source of bias, wasted votes, the two parties are relatively even. The total number of wasted 
votes for the Democratic Party is significantly greater. However, our analyses indicate that this 
difference is by reason of their presidential candidates winning the popular vote less often and 
losing by landslides in 1972 and 1984. 
 
THE 2000 AND 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
The previous discussion and analyses substantiate the findings of previous research which 
found the electoral college to be generally unbiased. Nevertheless, one should still explain how 
George W. Bush attained an electoral college victory in the 2000 presidential election despite 
losing the popular vote. Clearly, the electoral college system did not treat the two parties equally 
in the 2000 presidential election. The following section provides a detailed analysis of the 2000 
and 2004 presidential elections to examine George W. Bush's extraordinary victory in 2000 and 
whether or not the electoral advantages he enjoyed in his first election persisted in his 2004 
reelection. 
As noted previously, the two basic sources of bias in the electoral college are the price each 
party pays for electoral college votes and the number of votes each party wastes in states 
where they are victorious and states where they are defeated. Tables 5-8 display the least 
expensive and most expensive electoral college states in the 2000 and 2004 elections and the 
average number of votes each candidate paid per electoral college vote. At first glance, the data 
do not indicate that the Republican Party enjoyed the success it normally finds among smaller 
states in either the 2000 or 2004 presidential elections. In each election, it won only half of the 
ten least expensive states. However, among the most expensive states, the Republican Party 
won only three states in each election. More importantly, a comparison of the average number 
of votes cast for each party's electoral college votes suggests only a minimal difference favoring 
the Republican Party and George W. Bush in both the 2000 and 2004 elections. As Tables 7-8 
display, the Republican Party spent 4,687 fewer votes per electoral college vote than the 
Democratic Party in 2000 and only 2,181 fewer votes per electoral college vote in 2004. As with 
our aggregate analysis, the difference in vote costs for both elections is not statistically or 
substantially significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wasted votes are also an important source of partisan bias and Tables 9-10 display the sum of 
votes each party wasted in states where they were victorious and in states where they were 
defeated in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. Unsurprisingly, the results are at odds 
with each other for the 2000 presidential election. While the Democratic Party wasted more 
votes in those states where Al Gore won, the Republican Party actually wasted more votes in 
states where George W. Bush was defeated. Nevertheless, a comparison of the total number of 
wasted votes indicates that the Republican Party actually wasted 306,446 more votes than the 
Democratic Party. Clearly, wasted votes do not explain George W. Bush's 2000 electoral 
college victory. Finally, a quick analysis of Bush's successful 2004 reelection indicates that the 
Republican Party once again wasted more votes in states where Bush won and in those states 
where he lost. Overall, the Republican Party in the 2004 presidential election wasted 3,097,748 
votes in winning and losing causes. 
Considering the findings of both our cheap votes and wasted votes analyses, we conclude that 
the Republican Party's advantage in the 2000 electoral college was primarily on account of their 
spending votes more efficiently by wining more of the least expensive states. While the 
Republican Party spent only 4,687 fewer votes per electoral college vote than the Democratic 
Party, this represents a total of 1,265,454 votes when one multiplies it by the actual number of 
electoral college votes required to win the presidential election. Clearly, this represents a 
substantial number of votes which had a significant impact in such a close election. The second 
question we must answer is whether this was because of a systematic bias in favor of the 
Republican Party or rather the strategic decisions the Bush Presidential Campaign made during 
the 2000 election with regard to allocating their resources. While the results of the 2004 election 
suggests that the Bush Campaign again spent fewer votes per electoral college vote, it also 
indicates that they wasted a substantially greater number of votes which would have offset their 
efficiency in spending votes if the election had been any closer. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We believe that this research broadens the understanding of the issue of partisan bias in the 
electoral college by providing a fuller analysis of the institutional mechanisms of the electoral 
college. First, we clarify the various sources of potential bias in the electoral college (cheap 
votes and wasted votes). Second, we directly examine each of these sources of potential bias 
and do not find a significant advantage in favor of the Republican or Democratic Party, which 
supports the previous findings of Grofman, Brunell, and Campagna (1997) and Destler (1996). 
Third, we note that the erroneous perception of a Republican bias in the electoral college which 
persists is likely because of their advantage in smaller states (which contributed substantially to 
Bush's 2000 electoral college victory) and their popular vote success combined with the 
tendency of the winner-take-all system to artificially inflate the victorious candidate's electoral 
college margin. 
While the potential for bias within the institution of the electoral college is clearly high, we find 
that neither party over the last half-century has been able to consistently take advantage of 
these potential advantages. We argue that this is likely because of the fact that presidential 
candidates and the parties they represent are rational political actors, who understand the 
opportunities and problems of the institutional structure under which they work. Through the use 
of sophisticated polling and the strategic allocation of campaign resources, each party is able to 
diminish the inherent inefficiencies that confront their candidate and party. This was most vividly 
displayed in the 2004 presidential campaigns with the amount of attention each campaign 
committed to swing states. The Democratic Party knows that it is unlikely to achieve an electoral 
victory in solidly Republican states such as Wyoming and North Dakota and the Republican 
Party recognizes that it is unlikely to achieve electoral success in solidly Democratic states such 
as California and Massachusetts, hence, neither party waste limited resources in these states 
(Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2002; Reeves, Chen, and Nagano 2004; Shaw 1999). Ultimately, 
each party's presidential candidate expends their limited resources (time and money) rationally 
and as a result, the level of partisan bias in the electoral college is severely restricted. 
 
NOTES 
    1   An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the 2005 Meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. 
    2    This view is likely the result of the Republican Party's general advantage among several 
small states (which the electoral college overrepresents) and the inflated electoral college 
victories of several Republican presidents. An example of this view is characterized by the 
comments of a Democratic consultant who stated prior to the 1992 presidential election. “It's the 
same map we've had to deal with for years—and the results haven't been good. You need all 
the breaks with a map like that . . .” (Destler 1996, 421). 
    3    Data for the 1964-2000 presidential elections were attained from Congressional 
Quarterly's series: America at the Polls (McGillivray 2001). Data for the 2004 presidential 
election were attained from “David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections” (Leip 2004). All 
data utilized for the reported analyses and tables with all state results are available at 
http://www1.appstate.edu/~ardoinpj/ElectoralCollege.html. 
    4    For a list of the population per Electoral College vote for all states, see the authors' 
webpage at http://www1.appstate.edu/~ardoinpj/ElectoralCollege.html. 
    5    For a list of the votes cast per EC vote for all states, see the authors' webpage at 
http://www1.appstate.edu/~ardoinpj/ElectoralCollege.html. 
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